Maritime and National Security Blog

Bargains

The Navy is often suffers assaults from politicians wondering why the service is so profligate in its spending. On the other hand, our political leaders such as Nancy Pelosi (Treasure Island) and William Delahunt (South Weymouth) press the Navy for free or well below market value for very valuable property.  In this case, the Navy should stick to its course and insist on the proper price, the fair market value.  The service should not fear political retribution – the Navy has a number of powerful friends who want the service to prosper.  The service did survive the elimination of Navy bases in the San Francisco Bay area and the anger of the local congressional district.

Patrick, Delahunt Press Navy for Price Break on Former Weymouth Air Station

http://www.patriotledger.com/business/x206841856/Weymouth-s-SouthField-project-still-stuck-on-the-runway

Using the Riverine Force

The Navy’s reestablished Riverine Force, in response to a need in Iraq, is now a vital and important part of the service.  The Navy developed the need to return to its Brown Water mission because of the combat situation in Iraq.  The Tigris and Euphrates rivers are major waterways in the area and the Marine Corps began patrols early during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  Patrolling Iraqi rivers should more logically fall to the Navy, but the service was without a Riverine Force.

The U. S. Navy established the Riverine Force in 2003 and the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command that also includes other commands related to expeditionary warfare, in 2006.   This is a return to one of the Navy’s earliest missions. In the days of sail, ships were able to ply rivers, lakes and bays.  During the Civil War, river-based forces played a significant role in operations along the Mississippi and other rivers.  During Viet Nam, Riverine Forces patrolled the Mekong Delta and other Vietnamese waterways.  After that conflict, the service no longer believed that capability important enough to retain.

The Navy should not allow that mistake again. The Iraqi Navy is on the cusp of relieving the U. S. Navy of the responsibility to patrol Iraqi rivers.  Unless there is important work for NECC, it could become another lost capability.  Fortunately, the majority of our friends and allies have Navy’s that are more Brown Water than Blue.  Since NECC also includes the newly formed Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command (MCAST), it is a logical extension to employ the full force of the NECC in missions that exercise and train with the Riverine Forces and Coast Guards of other nations.  This will serve to increase their capability, improve their national security (Cambodia, Columbia, etc.) and protect their individual resources (Nigeria) and way of life.

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command

http://www.necc.navy.mil/

Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command Created

http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=48696

Navy Expeditionary Team Trains Next Generation of Cambodian Sailors

http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=49750

 

Riverine Force in Iraq

http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=48516

 

 

Ship of State

A small, probably unnoticed, provision of the 2009 Defense Authorization Bill (where is that Appropriations Bill?) makes a specific designation.  As of the signature of the President on that Bill, the USS Constitution is now the Ship of State.  Constitution is the oldest warship afloat – of any nation¹.  Navy history was made aboard this ship and Constitution is revered within the service.

This designation is a boon for the Navy – if it will use that new status.  The age of sail was a glorious one – in general – for the United States Navy. We can learn from the history, operations and values of that day – without all that nasty flogging of course.  Currently less than 200 First Class Petty Officers experience the legend of Constitution during their transition to Chief Petty Officer.  The Navy should certainly expand that as much as possible and use other means to promote the history and heritage of the U. S. Navy.  The service’s history is long and illustrious; each Sailor should be steeped in that history.

1.     HMS Victory, commissioned 20 years before Constitution is in drydock.

Ship of State

http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=49550

 

Building Relationships to Our South

From 10-12 November 2009, the Commander of U. S. Naval Forces Southern Command (NAVSO), Rear Admiral Victor Guillory held a maritime conference for navy leaders.  This was no ordinary conference but one for Senior Enlisted Leaders from the navies in the NAVSO area of responsibility (AOR). The Commander and his Command Master Chief, CMDCM (SS/SW) Mauricio Rueda, held the conference in the Dominican Republic. This was an exceptional sign of U. S. cooperation and desire for partnership.

Whatever the guidance and direction, this was an outstanding move, by a command team that obviously understands the nature of operations in South and Central America and values the enlisted force. The NAVSO team understands that relationships are important – at every level and that developing professional leaders and sharing information will strengthen relations with our neighbors. U. S. priorities in general turn toward Russia and China foremost, with good reason, but other regions while not taking precedence over these competitors, must still garner attention.

The list of nations that participated is a good start, but the nations not present were more obvious than those who attended - Antigua, Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, United States, and Uruguay.  There were no representatives from Central American nations, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia or Venezuela for example.  Granted some of these nations object strongly to any U. S. presence, but perhaps by the next conference NAVSO may convince others to join. A good example is Venezuela, not only do they object to the new Fourth Fleet and the base agreement with Columbia, but with the U. S. in general.  It is a strategic imperative to isolate Venezuela (for now) and every effort that strengthens other South and Central American nations and promotes U. S. good will and intentions is the right move.  Bravo to RADM Guillory and CMDCM Rueda.

Senior Enlisted Conference

http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=49576

Mauricio Rueda

Will post when rcvd from NAVSO

RADM Victor Guillory

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/bios/navybio.asp?bioID=132

 

The Arctic Ocean

Recently the USS Texas, a Virginia class submarine, surfaced at the North Pole.  She is one of several to do so over this past year in an uptick of U. S. activity in the Arctic Ocean.  It comes none too soon.  The U. S. Navy is accomplishing several things with this increase in Arctic operations.  It is exercising the (hopefully) each new Virginia class boat – and crew – in an environment not routinely used by U. S. submarines.  These operations also make it known that no nation has the exclusive right to the whole of the Arctic and like the Gulf of Sidra maneuvers in the early 1980s, not the province of any one nation.

In 2007, Vladimir Putin claimed all the resources of the Arctic for Russia.  This caused more than a bit of international outrage. Current international law allows the countries ringing the Arctic to claim only a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). All of those countries, Russia, Canada, the U.S., Norway, and Denmark (which owns Greenland) are currently in compliance.  Russian has only made the claim – planting a flag at 14,000 feet – and not taken any additional action to reinforce that claim. The efforts on the part of the submarine force are timed to provide a counterpoint to planted flags.

According to the Navy’s Maritime Policy (see …Strategy Part 1 for reference):

“Climate change is gradually opening up the waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system. While these developments offer opportunities for growth, they are potential sources of competition and conflict for access and natural resources.”

All true and somewhat prescient, however, this is the only mention of the Arctic in that document.  The United States Fleet Forces Command’s (USFFC) 2009 Annual Plan does not even mention the Arctic.   The Arctic Ocean is relatively unmonitored by the routine presence of either U. S. submarines or permanent hardware. Therefore, this ocean provides an excellent area to hide and launch missiles through decreasing polar ice. 

The United States is taking a measured approach to this ocean area.  The Navy and the Coast Guard are collaborating on a policy and approach to Arctic Operations (CNOs Guidance for 2010, p.14).  Canada is cooperative with respect to water space management (very important in this area) as a NATO partner and ally, but they are restive and desire the ability to assert some measure of control over their own EEZ and interests in the region.  The Canadian Victoria class submarine is not under ice capable and this provides a certain level of frustration.

U. S. Maritime Strategy must include Arctic operations, and a cogent, long-term plan in cooperation with allies and NATO partners to prevent the economic exploitation of the region by any one nation.

Putin Claims Arctic

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-464921/Putins-Arctic-invasion-Russia-lays-claim-North-Pole--gas-oil-diamonds.html

Canadian Concerns with Arctic Activity

http://www.canada.com/submarine+trip+Arctic+should+sound+alarms+Canada+expert/2228051/story.html

http://www.canada.com/submarine+trip+Arctic+should+sound+alarms+Canada+expert/2228051/story.html

USS Texas Pays Icy Visit to Arctic

http://www.honoluluadvertiser.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2009911080383

The Acquisition System Threat

One of the greatest threats to our maritime and national security (M-NS) is the acquisition system. The United States M-NS system depends on the advance of technology and its integration into fielded equipment and systems at a pace that is faster than any known or potential adversary. The acquisition system does not accommodate that goal. The most visible problems in acquisition get lots of press attention and are fairly well known (A-12, LCS cost over runs). However, it is the legion of small, and continual problem that are the most destructive and plague the system causing delays in fielding new technology. These small problems are perpetuated by a system that refuses to change and often to even acknowledge there is a problem. The bias of program managers, the inability of personnel in charge to make and defend a decision, the lack of vision on behalf of acquisition leaders and professionals, even Congress has a part of this problem.

Today the Defense Appropriations Bill remains in conference and therefore unsigned and there is no ability to fund ongoing projects. There is only 80% of 2009 funding for programs overall when a Continuing Resolution (CR) is in place and some program managers are even reluctant to spend at that level. This causes a slow down in project completion and unwillingness on the part of defense contractors to pay for work where there is no funding…yet.  Projects and programs slow to a crawl, with just the bare amount of work accomplished until the infusion of cash after the Appropriations Bill is signed and the money eventually reaches the folks doing the work, this can take weeks or months. There is no even strain on funding and Congress is to blame.

There are also a number of obstacles at all levels of the acquisition process that result in delays, cost inflation and frustration on all sides – government and contractor. Perhaps the most significant is the constant change in what the government wants in a system or piece of equipment, and the larger the system, the more changes the government is likely to make. Why all the change? Certainly there are a number of reasons, but the among the most prominent is the government does not know what it wants in the first place. This comes from a paucity of strategy and vision – clearly, if Navy leadership understood what the threats are or were going to be, there would be a certain clarity in the acquisition strategy. Equally as clear, if the acquisition system were more responsive those strategic aims would be given form sooner and might affect the global strategic picture…it is a cycle – cause and effect. DDG-1000 is an exquisite example of strategic needs outpacing the geologic pace of the acquisition system (trying to develop and integrate too many new technologies) and LCS being an idea that is given form a bit quicker (and at greater cost), but may not be the right system for the evolving threats or even be a well designed platform.

Another issue that haunts acquisition is something that one might consider so obvious that mentioning it would seem pointless – integrating humans into the design and operation of equipment and systems. Yet, the Navy design and acquisition system relegates the human to a minor role in the overall picture. This attitude is easily detected in any equipment, system, ship or submarine. The preparation of the budget for POM-12 emphasizes the effect of Total Ownership Costs (TOC), but until the acquisition system fully acknowledges and integrates the Sailor into the system from the very beginning, it will be for naught. 

The French Navy v. the Pirates

Despite the work of the European Union, India, Iran, China, Russia and the United States the scourge of piracy remains a feature off the coast of Somalia. A major problem for those many navies is the definition of off the coast.  In the early days of Somali piracy, it was often less than 100 miles; today the range extends up to 800 miles. This creates problems not only for shippers, but for the hunters as well; there is now more ocean to search, rather than a more concentrated area near shore.

The pirates continue to harass shipping creating numerous problems in the maritime industry, including cruise lines and with the capture of a British couple, private sailors as well. Now in a hunt that measures success by captures and headlines, the French seem to be quietly and effectively taking out more pirates than the combined forces of other nations. If the Somali pirates have good Intel on ships, the French must have equally good Intel on pirates. The French Navy currently accounts for more captures than any other nation, with the bulk of those pirates, about 70, now in French jails. Bravo.

The United States Navy has had one spectacular success but little else to show for their efforts. The hope at the Pentagon is that the LCS is the right platform for fighting the pirate problem, as soon as the numbers permit. The problem now is with the extension of the pirates’ hunting ground, LCS may not be the right platform, since its seakeeping ability in higher sea states is very likely not as good as larger platforms. What would bode well for the LCS, even as a smaller combatant, the pirates have shown, in all the French captures, a decided lack of willingness to fight it out. In one case they even threw all their weapons overboard. A positive outcome of the French successes is that the United States could potentially concentrate its combatant power elsewhere. Perhaps the 1,000 ship Navy concept has a chance or is that strategy passe as well?

 

FN v. Pirates 13 November 2009

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4375267&c=EUR&s=SEA

FN v. Pirates 07 October 2009

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/08/pirates-mistakenly-attack-french-navy-flagship/

FN v. Pirates 03 May 2009

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/05/03/kenya.pirates/index.html

FN v. Pirates 20 April 2009

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/15/pirates.captured/index.html

FN v. Pirates 10 April 2009

http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/15/pirates.captured/index.html

 

New Coast Guard Cutter

The delivery of the second National Security Cutter (NSC) Waesche (WMSL-751) occurred 06 November to good reviews from the Coast Guard. This marks the second collaboration between the Coast Guard and the Navy in the NSC program. The Navy’s Board of Inspection and Survey is responsible for inspecting the ship and the number of problems was significantly reduced from the first ship in the class. It would seem hopeful that the Coast Guards ship acquisition program is back on track after a number of problems with acquisition oversight, construction quality and cost problems. Admiral Thad Allen inherited the program but is doing his level best to put this program on a successful track.

INSURV now classifies their inspection reports, so there is a reliance on general reporting from the service itself on the quality of these ships. It is hopeful this reporting is fairly straightforward and correct; the USCG would not easily withstand another problem with their Deepwater program.

The Board of Inspection and survey is going to have a good deal of work on new combatants from the Coast Guard and the Navy over the next few years and their standards for shipbuilders must continue to tighten (San Antonio for example) to ensure ships for both USN and USCG fleets arrive ready to enter the fleet. The commander of this organization traditionally comes to INSURV as a final tour and as a two-star, with little independence and influence into the E Ring. The Navy would take a wise and bold step to strengthen the hand of this commander.

India and Japan Defense Alignment

The conference between the Defense Ministers of Japan and India on 09 November 2009 provide further definition to the regions power alignment. The pledge of cooperation is not unprecedented; the nations have had a generally cordial relationship since the 6^th century - it was only during the time of Imperial Japan that the relations soured. Over the last decade, the nation’s Prime Ministers have traded annual visits and signed several cooperation pacts. 

This recent meeting was the first between the Defense Ministers. The concern for both India and Japan is the growing power of China. A further concern for Japan is having a large regional partner to compliment the relationship with the United States – one that is a bit rocky of late with the new government in Tokyo. An additional concern for India is terrorism, especially from Pakistan. Japan does not offer a direct solution to that problem, nor does Japan provide a ready source of weapons (technology, yes – the U. S. is becoming a larger supplier*), Japan does provide a reliable and sympathetic partner for security cooperation and India is collecting such partners. It is also another valuable connection to the United States. Japan and India will also cooperate in naval exercises and will work together on anti-piracy efforts – again to counter the announced Chinese initiative against piracy and provide protection for the sea-lanes to their countries.

As this relationship deepens and if in the defense arena it is mutually beneficial, there will likely be additional levels of cooperation and treaty arrangements that line up the India-Japan- (South Korea-Australia) partnership more clearly against Chinese hegemony. In response, China will continue to align nations through economic means, rather than any military cooperation pacts. When China is confident in their economic entanglements, military cooperation with those entangled nations will be the next logical step.

*The latest Indian initiative is their pursuit of 10, C-17 “Globemaster” aircraft from Boeing through the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) office.

India-Japan Defense Cooperation

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4367201&c=ASI&s=TOP

India –Japan Relations

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/index.html

The Iranian Weapons Highway

Iran continues to use the sea to export weapons in its support of proxies and the spread of its particular brand of Islamic ideology. Before the more publicized Israeli seizure of a cargo vessel loaded with weapons on 04 November 2009, Yemen did the same. On 26 October, the Yemeni Navy seized the Iranian chartered Mahan-1 with a load of anti-tank weapons, alleged bound for the al-Houthi (Shiite) rebels in the north of Yemen.

Yemen does have a number of Russian T-72 tanks and recently used them with good effect against the rebels. Now, Yemen is not a nation we should necessarily embrace or cherish – they are accused of training insurgent fighters sent to Iraq and the country is a virtual criminal enterprise. However, as the old saying goes (and one that has gotten us into some trouble in the past) “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

We should take note of these two events, very close in time, as a message and a warning. The Islamic Republic of Iran is using the sea to spread weapons that will eventually find a use against nations that are our friends and allies – or against us. Certainly, Yemen seized the ship in their self-interest, but in this case, it is also in the interest of the United States.

The United States is reluctant to conduct certain maritime boardings and seizures on the high seas, those carrying cargo from especially troublesome and vengeful countries. We should consider the likelihood of such operations in the future and plan accordingly. This should be part of our strategic and operational thinking.

Eventually the Iranians will learn to ship weapons out of the reach of nations willing and able (possibly and hopefully with U. S. intelligence support) to stop them. At that point, the U. S. Navy may have to do a few non-compliant boardings. There will be a cost, politically and militarily and the howl will be loud in the U. N. as well. It would be wise to prepare the battle space, also both politically and militarily now.

Just like drug shipments…if you catch two, how many more are out there?

Yemen Seizes Iranian Ship

http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Yemen-seizes-an-Iranian-arms-ship.pdf

Israel Seizes Iranian Ship

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/04/israel-seizes-ship-weapons-hezbollah