A recent National Defense Magazine article again calls the Navy’s Acquisition program into question. This time the topic is undersea vehicles. The operational concept is a good one, using tethered or autonomous vehicles to detect mines or detect and trail enemy submarines; the later performing like a mobile SOSUS net. Great concept – poor execution. A previous post discussed the critical nature of acquisition to our maritime and national security, this is a system, process and program the Navy must get right, but seems to have little desire to correct. The leadership instead consistently pours good taxpayer money after bad expecting better results from contactors who have consistently proven disappointing. There are numerous examples, the A-12 (mercifully cancelled), LPD-17, DDG-1000 (though there are many interesting technologies – getting them to work together and in time is the question) and the Special Operations mini-sub to name a few.
The problem is the complexity of the system. Granted there must be a number of checks and balances, compliance with Congressional rules and Federal law, but too many checks and balances can lead to a stifling of the system, choking innovation and promoting bureaucratic bungling in the name of…checks and balances. Another point to note – the government thrives on complexity and remains, as an entity, that issues will remain complex and there is little use in trying to make something simpler when it is so – complex. A quick examination of the Defense Acquisition Framework will give you an idea of its complexity.
A short example or a problem with the process is the use of human factors and human systems integration. These disciplines are geared toward making designs efficient and human centered. The Navy continually promotes the essential nature of its people, the value of its Sailors and yet the people charged with saving the Navy time and money, making designs safer, more survivable, more cost efficient over the life cycle for systems and equipment people must use is withering away. They are generally not included in RFPs (LCS down select the latest example) and rarely called upon in the design phase – when they would do the service the most good.
This is only one example, many others exist…fodder for another post.
National Defense Magazine Article
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/March/Pages/DeploymentofUnderseaRobots.aspx
SOSUS
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_25/sosus2.htm
Defense Acquisition Framework
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