The Navy
has an attitude problem. What else could
really explain the constant firings of Commanding Officers? Commanding Officers generally meet their end
for several popular reasons. Loss of
confidence is very popular; a ubiquitous word that covers a lot of ground that
the navy would prefer remains covered. Personal behavior is also popular but
much less so than loss of confidence. The Navy fired a submarine CO caught
drinking and misbehaving with ROTC cadets for this reason – it was out in the
open and thus loss of confidence would not work. Less popular and much rarer is the Holly Graf
firing from USS COWPENS, cruelty and maltreatment, sounds like something from
the days of wooden ships.
Thus, we
come to the attitude issue. The Navy PR
folks state quite correctly that fired Commanding Officers are but a small
percentage of the over 1,000 Commanding Officers in the Navy. All true.
However, it is important to understand the nature of the Commanding
Officers in that small group. Those
Commanding Officers are overwhelmingly on the front line, ships, squadrons,
submarines. The references below contain
just a small sample. So the Navy fires a
small base CO (Bahrain November 2009, the 11th that year), fine…the
top line officers are in command at sea and every element of our nation’s
defense is important, more so the pointy end of the spear represented by most
of these fired officers. Allegedly these officers are our best and rose through
a system that filters out lesser performers. (the Submarine Force experience
during the first year of WWII is instructive on this point).
The Navy
has not quite gotten away from the God-like attitude held by a CO at sea. Certainly, that worked well in the days of
wooden ships when great distance, time and slow communication place enormous
responsibility on the Captain. Those
circumstances are a bit different now with greater communications and a ship
manned by brighter and more educated enlisted than crewed a wooden ship. The Captain must retain a large measure of
authority, but today the advancement of people and technology temper it. Navy training and education must also temper
the CO, evaluations must be honest and straightforward, and there must be some
introspection on the part of Navy leadership.
The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations must build
leaders for this century, not perpetuate attitudes of the past. Tradition is a great thing unless it
interferes with the ability to seek out and destroy the enemy with
effectiveness and cold efficiency.
USS Kitty Hawk – 09-03-2002
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=3400
USS John F. Kennedy – 08-27-04
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=14927
USS Newport News – 01-29-07
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=27508
Five Commanding Officers Fired in 5
Weeks – 2007 (plus an additional list)
http://www.paratrooper.net/commo/Topic238141-5-1.aspx
USS George Washington – 7-30-08
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=38840
VQ-3 – 08-13-08
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=39082
Three Commanding Officers fired in
One Week – 2008
http://www.patriotfiles.com/forum/showthread.php?t=87946
USS Port Royal – 02-11-09
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=42502
USS Hartford – 04-14-09
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=44319
Six Commanding Officers Fired from
January to March 2010
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/05/AR2010030504326.html
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