Maritime and National Security Blog

Another New-Old Idea for Submarines

The United States has world class nuclear submarine designers and an exceptional industrial base that crafts those designs into the best nuclear submarines built anywhere.  The Sailors of the United States Navy then make them the deadliest on the planet.  This is a very potent combination, exceptional design, manufacture and operation and with the VIRGINIA class, exceptional acquisition, a rarity in the Navy.  Only one problem, this network that turns ideas to steel¹ and steel into a feared combatant is under assault.  Yes, politicians again.

Fortunately there is a solution, one that goes beyond our borders and helps improve our national security while using the industry that created VIRGINIA.  This idea uses our prominence in submarines.  It requires and relies on our leadership. It necessitates a look a bit behind us in order to move forward.   It obliges us to look beyond any particular engineering prejudice and examine the value of the solution for the long term.  This solution does not compel our Navy to move away from current submarine concepts, but to include another concept that will broaden the strategic and tactical range of options for our national defense. The solution is one that has been broached (apologies to the submarine community) before and always gets a reaction from the Navy akin to telling them to shift from sail to coal – sacrilege.

There is much to recommend this new idea, but Navy leadership over the past number of years has shown a deft hand at deflecting the new in favor of the comfortable or the politically expedient solution – think LCS, a new concept made old and tired by poor acquisition, unimaginative design, worse manufacture and all the advantages politics offers.

A smart individual leverages strengths and strengthens weakness.  Our strength is submarine design, construction and operation.  Our weakness is numbers versus the planet’s vast oceans and the motivation of aggressor nations. Right now the United States is the preeminent submarine power in the Western world.  Britain and France closely follow and Japan is a bulwark in the Pacific.  Other allies are not even in the submarine minor league and yet should have a skilled and deadly, if smaller submarine force capable of regional denial to any adversary. 

It is not possible for U. S. submarines to be responsive to every mission, conflict or crisis.  Probably the one salient idea that did come from the office of the former occupant of the CJCS position was the 1,000 ship Navy.  It is unfortunate that it did not become a reality.  The basic concept is to expand the reach of the U. S. Navy by the use of strategic partnerships with other Navies.  This requires a certain capacity for each country’s Navy and their willingness to take up some of the burden in a manner similar to U. S. operations².  This would free the U. S. to apply submarine capacity to areas not well covered by other nations and provide more focus for the unique strengths of U. S. submarine power.  This arrangement would also be a powerful deterrent to aggressors.  It requires all member Navies to cooperate strategically, tactically and have the wherewithal to do both.

As far as submarine operations go, we can really only consistently rely on the British, the Japanese and the French under President Sarkozy.  We need also to have reliable submarine partners in Canada, India, Brazil and Australia.  There are certainly other nations that would add greatly to a network of submarine operations, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Italy and Norway might also prove apt partners in submarine operations.  The problem is having a reliable submarine that each nation could afford.

The solution, the United States should design and build a Joint Fast Attack submarine with partner nations.  The Joint Strike Fighter is the precedent, but with a plus in the submarine community, it would be built a lot smarter and in a more cost effective manner.  The VIRGINIA Class proved a submarine could be designed, built and delivered under cost and ahead of schedule.  We have a superb industrial base that should want to work this project.  There are a number of nations who need submarines and are usually offered used models because of cost. The problem for us – the Navy hates anything but nuclear power.  However, we can put our submarine industry to work and probably produce great boats at a lower cost per unit, when we approach the problem in a joint way.

Notes

1. This certainly includes all of the innovative technology
2. There are certainly sovereignty and treaty concerns

Australian Submarines Outdated

http://www.canberratimes.com.au/act-news/sinking-feeling-our-subs-outdated-20120227-1tz3h.html

Warship Costs

http://newwars.wordpress.com/warship-costs/

The Wrong Message: Three SSGNs Surface Around Asia

President Roosevelt’s statement to talk softly and carrying a big stick was probably a good piece of advice when the United States emerged as a world power over 100 years ago.  It is lousy advice now.  More appropriate might be talk softly and let them guess where the stick is today.

 

The arrival of three of the four OHIO Class SSGNs in three different ports in the Asian-Indian Ocean region is the invention of public relations experts, not military strategists.  According to news reports, a number of Asian nations urged the United States to push back against recent Chinese aggressiveness in the region.  In response, we do the Teddy Roosevelt thing and surface three large missile-carrying submarines.  Brilliant.  Far better is the traditional Carrier Strike Group, but that may not be message enough for the PR folks in DC since there is one in Japan.

 

It is very much akin to Tim Robbins character in Bull Durham, a new pitcher. When questioned by Kevin Costner, in his role as a catcher, about why he continues to throw fastballs against advice Robbins states a need to announce his presence with authority.  Costner tells the batter the next pitch will be a fastball, the batter connects, no more authority.

 

Sending this type of message ignores centuries of Chinese history, character and the current thinking of the Chinese government.  If the United States wants to send a message to China, it should be a message to make them nervous.  An open show of force only motivates the Chinese military; we are seeing the results of that motivation today because they no longer wish to tolerate a carrier interfering in the region as it did in 1996.

 

“Some observers believe that China’s naval modernization effort may have been reinforced or accelerated by a 1996 incident in which the United States deployed two aircraft carrier strike groups to waters near Taiwan in response to Chinese missile tests and naval exercises near Taiwan (Congressional Research Service, 2010).”

 

It is simply breathtaking and mind boggling that the leadership of the United States Navy and the JCS Chairman¹ would undertake such an effort and then deny they did it on purpose.  Their message lacks long-term strategic value since the Chinese will respond with an equally potent message.  This message may not be today or next week, but it will come.  We can reassure our allies in the region without this little display.  Far better to keep the Chinese guessing, they know our capabilities, we should keep the location to ourselves, make them wary not angry.  Confusion to the enemy.

 

Note 1:  Some would say that given the armchair quality of the current JCS and Navy leadership, it is actually not all that mind-boggling.

 

Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf

 

Story from the Taipei Times

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/07/10/2003477581]

 

Story from the Vancouver Sun

http://www.vancouversun.com/news/deploys+submarines+message+China/3254839/story.html

The Afghan Army - Take 2

There seem to be few professionals with the stature and respect to generate an opinion many others will heed. General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret) has spent a lot of time in the Middle East and recently returned from a trip to Afghanistan. He reported on that trip to the Faculty at West Point where he is an Adjunct Professor. His 05 December 2009 Memo is informative and fact filled.  He also states that, “We are unlikely to achieve our political and military goals in 18 months.”  Eighteen months is the President’s deadline. (see earlier post on the Afghan Army)  General McCaffrey believes it will be a multi-year effort, he did not comment specifically on domestic support for such an extension, but did note that over 60% of the U. S. population is unsupportive of the effort at some level.

 

He does note both the problems and the success of stabilizing this dreadfully poor country.  Surprisingly his opinion of Hamid Karzai does not square with the vast majority of media portrayals, perhaps there is hope – though even President Karzai’s brother is seen as corrupt.

 

The reason this effort will take so long is the gaining strength of the Taliban, which seems tied directly to the support of drug money, al Qaeda and very likely other sponsorship.  There is too much progress in their attack strategies and resources to believe they are developing this capability on their own.  There is state power behind the Taliban effort. 

 

Because the military, both NATO and Afghan are deeply involved in fighting, because the country is so unstable, non-governmental agencies have very little presence and so the development of civil society is slow.  In addition, the people allegedly do not support the Taliban, but are hedging their bets by dealing with both sides.  This is certainly in their personal interest, the Taliban are a violent group.  It does slow national stability.

 

The one thing that seems so important to Afghanistan that the General did not mention is a sense of national identity – and from there will flow better unity among the varied tribal factions.  The Afghan people need this sense of nationalism.  The Taliban are very willing to provide an identity, if we allow it to happen. It is this important bit of psychology that the diplomatic, political and NATO forces must encourage at every level.

 

General Barry McCaffrey Memo on Afghanistan

http://www.cffc.navy.mil/091206_AAR_-_November_2009.pdf

 

General McCaffrey Biography

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barry_McCaffrey

The Afghan Army

Political commentary usually suffers from the emphasis on politics over analysis and bias over impartiality.  Concentration on these qualities, whether on a speech, policy or document, avoids the deeper aspects of a problem and obscures for others the truth of the matter.  Such is the problem yet again with the commentary after President Obama’s speech at West Point. It seems the proper time to comment after all the punditry is complete and the topic is no longer a prime news topic, yet still a very important issue.

The pundits concentrated on the President’s delivery, the character and behavior of the audience, why the decision took so long, how Congress would pay for the new deployments, the timetable, why the President is not supplying all the requested troops and other issues that bear little on the problem.  There was little or no substantive analysis of the true challenges to operations in Afghanistan. There was little discussion about a realistic end game for this war torn nation.

No matter the bias of the media establishment, all of them seem to see a resurgent Afghanistan as the goal for all the U. S. effort in the region. However, the very basic question is whether the United States and its allies can establish a stable government supported by the majority of Afghans that would have the will and ability to control the Taliban threat and by extension al Qaida before July 2011.  The answer is certainly no.

However, it is a NO, with a caveat.  One of the aforementioned requirements could compensate for a lack of progress in the others…control through the Afghan Army. This security force has been nearly eight years in the making and still does not come close to providing the security required by a government held hostage in Kabul and other larger cities.  It is an important element to long-term security, yet received small mention in the President’s speech.

The hazard in building a reliable security organization (Army, Police) is the creation of a force that would not only overcome insurgent elements, but also provide more reliable governance than the current civilian government.  There is no history of democracy or civilian control of the military in Afghanistan. The hazard in not building a competent security force is the potential to lose to the Taliban.

The training of the Afghan Army and Security Forces must increase in intensity and direction.  Combat skills, of course, but also training to overcome cultural and tribal problems that will fracture the Army with pressure from outside as well as inside.  The Afghan Army must be able to withstand the Taliban, drug lords, tribal factions and a corrupt government. The current pace of training will not achieve the goal of between 150,000 and 200,000 troops by the President’s deadline. The long term problem is how to sustain such a force in a nation with less than GDP of Delaware.

President Obama’s Speech at West Point – 01 December 2009

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan

India and Japan Defense Alignment

The conference between the Defense Ministers of Japan and India on 09 November 2009 provide further definition to the regions power alignment. The pledge of cooperation is not unprecedented; the nations have had a generally cordial relationship since the 6^th century - it was only during the time of Imperial Japan that the relations soured. Over the last decade, the nation’s Prime Ministers have traded annual visits and signed several cooperation pacts. 

This recent meeting was the first between the Defense Ministers. The concern for both India and Japan is the growing power of China. A further concern for Japan is having a large regional partner to compliment the relationship with the United States – one that is a bit rocky of late with the new government in Tokyo. An additional concern for India is terrorism, especially from Pakistan. Japan does not offer a direct solution to that problem, nor does Japan provide a ready source of weapons (technology, yes – the U. S. is becoming a larger supplier*), Japan does provide a reliable and sympathetic partner for security cooperation and India is collecting such partners. It is also another valuable connection to the United States. Japan and India will also cooperate in naval exercises and will work together on anti-piracy efforts – again to counter the announced Chinese initiative against piracy and provide protection for the sea-lanes to their countries.

As this relationship deepens and if in the defense arena it is mutually beneficial, there will likely be additional levels of cooperation and treaty arrangements that line up the India-Japan- (South Korea-Australia) partnership more clearly against Chinese hegemony. In response, China will continue to align nations through economic means, rather than any military cooperation pacts. When China is confident in their economic entanglements, military cooperation with those entangled nations will be the next logical step.

*The latest Indian initiative is their pursuit of 10, C-17 “Globemaster” aircraft from Boeing through the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS) office.

India-Japan Defense Cooperation

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4367201&c=ASI&s=TOP

India –Japan Relations

http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/index.html

Conflict in Space and Conflict in Policy

The head of China’s Air Force, General Xu announced that conflict in space was inevitable. He openly acknowledged that space would be a battleground for competing militaries. This revelation comes in remarks for the 60^th Anniversary of the People’s Air Force, up to now a less well-known and perhaps less influential political force. It also comes only days after General Xu Caihou, the head of China’s military, declared the China’s intent to pursue a course of cooperation and accommodation. 

This brings up several questions. Why the difference in talking points? Is the Air Force going off the reservation or is it just the acknowledgement that the transition of military conflict to space is a natural extension of terrestrial conflict. This position would be a departure for China, since they have generally conformed to the peaceful use of outer space.

General Xu Qiliang, the Chief of the Air Force, unlike General Xu Caihou is more a professional military man, having spent his first 14 years in the Air Force as pilot, before moving into positions that are more responsible. He does have strong political connections – a requirement for upward mobility to this level. He is also very familiar with Taiwan related planning.

The Chinese have made great strides in space technology in a very short period and they will obviously watch the U. S. reaction to this statement closely to help guide their next move.

Conflict in Space Inevitable

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/11/04/china-declares-space-war-inevitable/

General Xu Qiliang

http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Xu_Qiliang/career

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/09/world/asia/09iht-china.1.7812902.html?_r=1

 

Captain We're Being Scanned

The Chinese are nothing if not patient. Like Germany in the 1930’s, they are building capability, doing their best to allay the fears of their regional neighbors and international competitors and probing for weakness. Winston Churchill’s book The Gathering Storm (conveniently on the Navy’s professional reading list) describes the German effort and it seems somewhat applicable to modern China.

A Pentagon report states, ”Chinese military hackers have prepared a detailed plan to disable America’s aircraft battle carrier fleet with a devastating cyber attack.” The Pentagon receives numerous attacks each day – 79,000 in 2005. China wants a path to our computer systems, as many as possible.

In our very networked military we also rely heavily on satellite communication, this is also a subject of Chinese action – remember the successful anti-satellite test in 2007?  If you can hit a satellite, you are more likely able to also counter an incoming missile. The U. S. is doing both with the same weapon – the SM-3.

Incidents at sea also indicate China’s more aggressive posture, but with the intent not to stop the U. S. - today, but to test and probe. The harassment of the USNS Impeccable was certainly and overtly a challenge to our entry into their self-declared 200-mile exclusive economic zone, but it was also to disrupt the ships’ ability to monitor submarine operations and to test U. S. reaction and reaction time.

The surfacing of the Song Class submarine in USS Kitty Hawk’s wake was also a test. It is not that hard, as the Chinese discovered, to closely shadow a carrier, especially if the battle group does not expect any problems and it is peacetime on the high seas after all. The Chinese were practicing, probing and gathering intelligence. It is difficult to imagine that being on the surface was intentional. You do not give away war reserve capability.

This seems a bit like a sky is falling post…but the evidence is mounting, the dots are accumulating and the line is starting to form. During a recent visit to the U. S. by General Xu (Defense Secretary equivalent), he stressed accommodation not confrontation with the United States. He is a political general, not the Petraeus or McChyrstal kind and General Xu’s particular message and tactic would be very familiar to Sir Winston.

 

References:

Chinese Harass USNS Impeccable

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29596179/

Song Class Submarine Surfaces behind Kitty Hawk

http://www.defensetech.org/archives/002969.html

Chinese Cyber Attacks

http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Technology/story?id=3966047&page=1&page=1

http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/article2409865.ece

Chinese Anti-Satellite Test

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/AR2007011801029.html

General Xu Caihou

http://www.china.org.cn/english/PP-e/48930.htm