Maritime and National Security Blog

The 1000 Ship Navy - Part 1

The 1,000 Ship Navy is an idea that is slowly losing traction, should it.  After a flurry of press briefings, speeches, articles, testimony and even a study by the Australians, the concept of a 1,000-ship navy seems less able to attract attention.  On its face it seems a good idea, connect all the nation’s navy’s by a common purpose.  It must be a good idea, it already went through the obligatory name change –remember “From the Sea” and “Forward, From the Sea”?  It is now the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) lends itself to an acronym much better.

Typically there was a great deal of ambition in this effort and great hope, perhaps too much of both. It is quite possible that the scale of the effort was too much and perhaps a smaller effort with goals that are more limited and room to grow would work much better in the risk-averse world that our allies occupy.

The United States Navy cannot be everywhere, though we would like too.  Our allies often don’t want to be anywhere, so therein lies the problem.  Fodder for anther post.

Implications for the Royal Australian Navy

http://www.navy.gov.au/w/images/PIAMA24.pdf

Defense Daily

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/DEFENSE_DAILY_25OCT06_Global_Maritime_Partnership_Gaining_Steam_At_Home_And_With_International_Navies.pdf

USNI Blog

http://blog.usni.org/2009/01/08/preemptive-failure-of-the-global-maritime-partnership/

1000 Ship Navy Concept

http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,81652,00.html

1000 Ship Navy Review by Janes’

http://www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/jfs/jfs060612_1_n.shtml

 

Come Along Side – Don’t Tie Up

There is an odd combination of personality, background and experience in the Eric Massa news item.  A Representative from Florida, he will retire after one term because of a remission in cancer he thought beaten a few years back.  Meanwhile, the Ethics committee may investigate him, in part because of the way he treats his staff.  Who could imagine a politician having ethics issues or a former Surface Naval Offier mistreating his staff and using salty language.  He states he is a “salty old Sailor”, curious also, since officers generally do not prefer to be called Sailors.

Massa to Retire After One Term

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/03/04/hoyer-learned-massa-harassment-claim-february-ethics-review-way/

Eric Massa

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Massa

 

The Arctic Ocean

Recently the USS Texas, a Virginia class submarine, surfaced at the North Pole.  She is one of several to do so over this past year in an uptick of U. S. activity in the Arctic Ocean.  It comes none too soon.  The U. S. Navy is accomplishing several things with this increase in Arctic operations.  It is exercising the (hopefully) each new Virginia class boat – and crew – in an environment not routinely used by U. S. submarines.  These operations also make it known that no nation has the exclusive right to the whole of the Arctic and like the Gulf of Sidra maneuvers in the early 1980s, not the province of any one nation.

In 2007, Vladimir Putin claimed all the resources of the Arctic for Russia.  This caused more than a bit of international outrage. Current international law allows the countries ringing the Arctic to claim only a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). All of those countries, Russia, Canada, the U.S., Norway, and Denmark (which owns Greenland) are currently in compliance.  Russian has only made the claim – planting a flag at 14,000 feet – and not taken any additional action to reinforce that claim. The efforts on the part of the submarine force are timed to provide a counterpoint to planted flags.

According to the Navy’s Maritime Policy (see …Strategy Part 1 for reference):

“Climate change is gradually opening up the waters of the Arctic, not only to new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system. While these developments offer opportunities for growth, they are potential sources of competition and conflict for access and natural resources.”

All true and somewhat prescient, however, this is the only mention of the Arctic in that document.  The United States Fleet Forces Command’s (USFFC) 2009 Annual Plan does not even mention the Arctic.   The Arctic Ocean is relatively unmonitored by the routine presence of either U. S. submarines or permanent hardware. Therefore, this ocean provides an excellent area to hide and launch missiles through decreasing polar ice. 

The United States is taking a measured approach to this ocean area.  The Navy and the Coast Guard are collaborating on a policy and approach to Arctic Operations (CNOs Guidance for 2010, p.14).  Canada is cooperative with respect to water space management (very important in this area) as a NATO partner and ally, but they are restive and desire the ability to assert some measure of control over their own EEZ and interests in the region.  The Canadian Victoria class submarine is not under ice capable and this provides a certain level of frustration.

U. S. Maritime Strategy must include Arctic operations, and a cogent, long-term plan in cooperation with allies and NATO partners to prevent the economic exploitation of the region by any one nation.

Putin Claims Arctic

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-464921/Putins-Arctic-invasion-Russia-lays-claim-North-Pole--gas-oil-diamonds.html

Canadian Concerns with Arctic Activity

http://www.canada.com/submarine+trip+Arctic+should+sound+alarms+Canada+expert/2228051/story.html

http://www.canada.com/submarine+trip+Arctic+should+sound+alarms+Canada+expert/2228051/story.html

USS Texas Pays Icy Visit to Arctic

http://www.honoluluadvertiser.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2009911080383

The Need for an Effective Maritime Strategy – Part 2

The Maritime Strategy, actually called A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, provides a good overview of why a maritime nation needs a navy.  It also contains two basic tenets – being ready for conflict and preventing war - basic.  The strategy rightly calls out people as the most important element of this strategy and goes on to promise the “training, education and tools necessary to promote peace and prevail in conflict (p.5).”

There is very little new, groundbreaking or especially original within the document.  One of the few potentially powerful concepts is that “Seapower will be a unifying force for building a better tomorrow (p.5).”  Regrettably, there is little to reinforce that thought.

A short discussion of the general nature of threats to the United States and the Navy contains the usual suspects but exceptions do occur. There is a realization that economic behavior will significantly influence international relations “…competition for resources and capital with other economic powers, transnational corporations and international organizations (p.6).”  Less than a year after the introduction of this strategy document Russia claimed the resources of the Arctic by planting a flag on the sea floor.

The second realization is that, “globalization is also shaping human migration patterns, health, education, culture, and the conduct of conflict. Conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways (p.6).”

There is no mention of China or Russia, except in a general sense about major power conflict. The strategy ignores the emerging naval strength of India, the regional ambitions of China and the reemergence of Russia as an ambitious power.  Without a well-considered review of challenges and threats, it is not possible to develop a cogent strategy that will drive operations, training and targeted acquisition.  A general approach to strategy development will produce a general approach to maritime security.  

This may seem the right approach, cover all the bases, but it risks not covering the right ones and wasting assets on the wrong ones.  The Navy, at least under the current and immediate past CNOs, is risk averse and reacts poorly to political pressure (e.g. ship acquisitions, the IA program). This may partially explain the reasoning behind the strategy.  It remains to examine how the Navy will counter the general nature of the anticipated threats.

References…please refer to Part 1

The Need for an Effective Maritime Strategy – Part 1

It seems more appropriate to begin a blog on Maritime and National Security by examining the underlying strategy before getting down to commenting and recommending changes to specific elements supporting the strategy.

Note:  All page numbers refer to” The Maritime Strategy” available at: www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf

Why does the Navy seem unfocused – strategically?  The Maritime Strategy signed in 2008 by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Conway, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Allen and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Roughhead certainly provides the proper strategic guidance to operationalize the navy, to drive acquisition, as well as manpower personnel and training. No.  If it did would the Navy continue to have tussles with Congress over shipbuilding plans - and it is not because the Navy ranks only slightly above the Coast Guard in acquisition prowess.  Would personnel decisions seem to come out of the ether?  Would many South American nations so stridently object to some Navy operations and policies? A big problem is a lack of a good strategy.  The Navy needs a strategy the service could reasonably use to develop an operational plan. The Navy needs an operational plan that will more effectively advance service goals and increase maritime and national security.

The Maritime Strategy is the latest strategy document for the Navy.  This document replaces the “Forward from the Sea“strategy and for the first time includes both the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard – all the maritime services.  The Maritime Strategy is a colorful 20-page document.  On its second page, there is a statement “Sea power protects the American way of life.”  This is an American attitude that is only just over a century old, a story for another post.  In the context of this strategy, it is germane because this document is not Admiral Roughhead’s, it was an inheritance from his predecessor.

The Maritime Strategy’s real parent is Admiral Michael Mullen.  He would have rolled it out but strangely, President Bush gave him the Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs, again fodder for another post.  With great fanfare, Admiral Mullen had a traveling road show that held a “conversation with the country (p.3).”  Why does he need to ask the country?  This is Admiral Mullen’s and the Navy’s area of expertise, the country is paying him to develop a strategy.  So, what does the conversation with the country reveal, what insights did the Navy glean from its PR road show?

 

“Three themes dominated these discussions: our people want us to remain strong; they want us to protect them and our homeland, and they want us to work with partners around the world to prevent war (p.3).” 

This must have been a real Homer Simpson moment for Admiral Mullen, with apologies to Mr. Simpson.